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abstract: deleuze’s philosophical method is analyzed and positioned against the background of 
the intellectual/religious tradition of practical mysticism that has been traveling the globe across 
times, places, languages, and cultural barriers. the paper argues that deleuze’s unorthodox 
ontology of the virtual enables a naturalistic interpretation of the functioning of mysticism when 
the triad of concepts, percepts and affects is formed in accordance with the logic of the included 
middle.
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this paper proposes to examine a tradition of practical mysticism mostly associated with 
Plotinus and neo-Platonic thought as a blend of Plato’s and aristotle’s teachings and the 
form of knowledge that impels practical virtuous action and includes an intense self-knowing coupled 
with the knowledge of  God as One. Tracing the continuity of  this intellectual/religious thought that has 
been traveling the globe across times, places, languages, and cultural barriers, we briefly 
revisit the legacy of aristotelian phronesis as it pertains to the historical development of 
mystical teachings in Judaism, christianity and islam. We further move to continental 
philosophy and an apparently unlikely confluence of some of the elements of mystical 
tradition with Jürgen Habermas’ third way of knowing as well as the philosophical thought 
of gilles deleuze (cf. semetsky & lovat 2008). 
the focus of this essay is specifically on deleuze’s ontology of the virtual and his 
experiential method of transcendental empiricism that, we argue, enables a naturalis-
tic understanding of the functioning of practical mysticism. even if deleuze is usually 
considered to be a radical materialist, some cross-currents between his philosophy and 
the discourse on religion have recently been addressed (Bryden 2001) covering topics 
as diverse as spirituality, cosmology, and biblical themes. We will analyze in detail the 
logic of the included middle as the basis of/for deleuze’s philosophy. the paper asserts 
that because for deleuze percepts, affects and concepts constitute an irreducible triad, 
knowledge becomes necessarily grounded in a religious dimension of experience, espe-
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cially if we understand the meaning of re-ligio literally as an auto-referential self-reflec-
tive process linking backward to the origins. 
in contrast to solely faith-based religion, practical mysticism enriches it with 
action as the level of practical experience. Plotinus, having captured the best of 
what went before him in greek philosophy, also was instrumental in the later 
development of higher forms of mysticism in Judaism, christianity and islam 
especially in terms of his “favoring of love over understanding” (idel & mcginn 
1999: 22). each of these three religions is particularly associated with an ethical 
impact and practical action as constituting the keystone of faith in their traditions, 
be it the practice of the ten commandments, Jesus’ great commandment to 
love god and neighbour, or the five Pillars of islam. hence practical mysticism 
can be conceived  as the blending of spiritual foundation with practical good.  
Plotinus’ thought as embodying both Plato’s and aristotle’s teachings (cf. armstrong 
1996) has resulted in the neo-Platonic form of philosophy that influenced both early 
medieval thinking and the conceptual world of christendom. aristotle’s philosophy, 
even as his model was organic, was also inspirational for a number of interpreters in the 
semitic tradition, such as abu al-ghazzali, aquinas, or cordovero. Whille al-ghazzali 
was devoted to Jesus, his intellectual guide was aristotle with muhammad being his pro-
phetic hero. al-ghazzali contributed to reforming the islamic expression of the semitic 
mystical tradition, sufism, away from pietistic religiousness and towards practical mysti-
cism as an integration of the virtue of self-knowledge and the practical action for good. 
the text of the muslim gospel attributed to al-ghazzali says, “Jesus said: It is of  no use 
to you to come to know what you did not know, so long as you do not act in accordance with what you 
already know” (Khalidi 2001: 178). for cordovero, while god’s attributes remained out-
side human virtue and could only be achieved through mystical experience, this very 
experience was supposed to have been confirmed only by their having been achieved. 
such obvious circularity is what makes practical mysticism appear, in fact, mystical. ar-
istotle’s Intellect (nous poetikos) is still subject to disputes whose historical or philosophical 
scope is beyond the scope of this paper; what is important, however, is that it blends 
inner knowledge with an impersonal, cosmic and transcendent, entity as both of them 
“think” each other. 
among continental philosophers, such unity of knowledge is exemplified in hab-
ermas’ concept of communicative action in the latter’s function as mediation and har-
mony between self-knowledge and understanding others (see lovat 2004, 2006). While 
much of habermas’ scholarship appears to be defined by forms of neo-marxist athe-
ism, his later work has turned to issues related more explicitly to theology, spirituality 
and the mystical thought (habermas 2001; cf. martin 2005). as noted by one author 
(lovat 2004), habermas’ theory of knowledge reaches further back to the tradition of 
mysticism in antiquity. in regard to practical mysticism, he re-defined (for a secularized 
generation) a concept that has, in a sense, been in the tradition for millennia, in both 
religious and secular contexts, namely that the best knowledge is that which would have 
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produced  a real impact in terms of our practical action for good. 
Beginning with aristotelian phronesis, habermas expands on it by decentering the 
self; thus implicitly problematizing its very logic.as nicolas adams comments in his 
recent book Habermas and Theology (adams 2006), habermas may be considered as heir 
both to the idealist readings of german mystics and to the Jewish critique on the basis of 
Kaballah.suggesting “linguistification” as a process of achieving mutual understanding 
in practice, describes it dynamically as first of all distancing oneself from the religious 
consensus up to “shrinking down the domain of the sacred” (1987: 83) as an obvious 
critique of idolatry or dogma. nonetheless, habermas touches on distinctively mystical 
ways of knowing in challenging us to consider a particular self-reflective (classified as 
third) way. 
habermas clarifies linguistification as a narrative regarding the power of reflec-
tion. significantly, “[t]his narrative does not place habermas at odds with theologians” 
(adams 2006: 83) but rather transfers an explanatory focus from uniquely the domain 
of the narrowly understood sacred to the communicative action by us humans that in-
volves the transformation of the self and engaging in praxis as a radical and quasi-mysti-
cal means of making a difference in the world. habermas’ emphasis on the ideal speech 
act has “a curious afterlife in theology long after it disappears from habermas’ own 
texts [and] [t]heologians recognize in it a faint echo of…aspirations to a healed world” 
(adams 2006: 36). reciprocally, it is only as based on a profound self-knowledge that an 
effective practical action for good takes its turn. 
as such, the philosophical mystical tradition should not be confused with contem-
porary “new age controversy [which] explains away” (Kearney 2001: 47-48) transcend-
ence but instead grounded in the fact that it is human action in our very practice that 
can “make the world a more just and loving place, or not to” (Kearney 2001: 5). the 
said injunction (“or not to”) is significant. the fecundity and we ourselves becoming able 
to make a difference means for mystics to “partake in God’s life …share in God’s life-giving 
love…break through existing theological theories in order to stress the unity of  love and cognition” (idel 
& mcginn 1999: 13-14, 22).  as Kearney comments, “creatures need a creator and 
a creator needs creatures” (2001: 103) in a mutually harmonious action: both “think” 
each other, indeed…
moshe idel, contemporary scholar in castilian Kabbalah, mysticism, and messian-
ism of abraham abulafia (idel 1998), underlines the unity between the human and the 
divine as well as the mystery involved in self-knowledge as leading to the confluence of 
cause and effect, that is, an appearance of a mystical self-cause in the noblest forms of 
human action:
… in the profundities of human thought there is no one more profound and more 
excellent than it (= the product of mystical union) and it alone unites human thought 
with the divine (thought) to the extent of the human capability and according to 
human nature. and it is known that human thought is the cause of his wisdom, 
and his wisdom is the cause of his understanding, and his understanding is the 
cause of his mercy, and his mercy is the cause of his reverence of his creator (idel 
1988: 147).
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the problematic of such circular self-reference has been considered an unsolvable phil-
osophical problem; it simply could not have been explained within the usual rationalist 
linear method akin to one borrowed from classical science with its direct mechanistic 
causality; therefore qualified irrational hence thoroughly mystical.
it is here that deleuze’s powerful philosophical method of transcendental empiri-
cism enters the picture (semetsky 2003, 2006, 2008). his method is empirical by virtue 
of the object of investigation regarded as real, albeit sub-representative, experience; yet 
it is transcendental because the very foundations for the empirical principles are a priori 
left outside the common faculties of perception so as to require a transcendental analy-
sis of their implicit conditions. in this respect, transcendental empiricism purports to 
discover conditions that exist prior to the actual commonsensical experience. deleuze’s 
ontology of the virtual (cf. Boundas 1996; may & semetsky 2008) emancipates think-
ing from common sense. the deleuzian object of experience is considered to be given 
only in its tendency to exist: the very nature of any “thing”, according to deleuze, is just 
an expression of tendency; therefore making it “no-thing” rather than an actual “thing” 
given to common sense. 
it may appear that deleuze’s philosophy is anti-metaphysical and negative (not unlike 
negative theology; cf. Kearney 20011) but only at a first glance. even if for deleuze the 
question of Being is not amenable to conceptual identification proper, he still qualifies 
“Being as fold” (deleuze 1988a: 110). if we step away from the familiar philosophical 
notion of identity, the question of Being can be presented in slightly more positive terms 
in terms of the virtual and the actual. the actual, while composed of identities which we 
perceive and interact with, is not all there is. Behind, beneath, and within the actual is 
the virtual. the virtual gives rise to the actual, and yet remains a part of it in a manner 
of Japanese origami. a piece of paper can be conceptualized as the virtual “field” that 
yields different actual figures when the paper is folded and unfolded in a multiplicity of 
ways. the actual is composed of identities, the virtual is not. the virtual is not a mirror 
of the actual, the relation between them is com-pli-cated (le pli, in french, means the 
fold) and, significantly, ”the virtual is not opposed to the real; it possesses a full reality by 
itself. the process it undergoes is that of actualisation” (deleuze 1994:  211). 
But if the virtual is distinct from the identities of the actual, and if it is itself real, then 
what is it? it is difference, the ground of difference, out of which the actual emerges and 
which the actual carries with it. Being, then, is this virtual/actual nexus of difference, 
the mutual enfoldment of ”two inseparable planes in reciprocal presupposition”(deleuze 
and guattari 1987: 109). for deleuze, difference “is the noumenon closest to phenom-
     1. We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on the first draft of this paper 
and one reviewer’s specifically noticing the relevance of Kearney’s naturalistic position in onto-theology that 
indeed compromises the assumed division between being and non-being. however, rather than staying at 
the level of the metaphorical language, as Kearney does, for elucidating mystical experience, we strengthen 
our argument by bringing into this conversation the new science of coordination dynamics (see further 
below) that enables a naturalistic explanation of the functioning of practical mysticism in the world which is 
at once both virtual and real and where immanence-transcendence divide can being traversed within our 
actual, practical, experiences.
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enon” (deleuze 1994: 222), that is, by virtue of its own ontological status it is difference 
that can also make a difference in the world of human experiences. the dynamic of differ-
ence is of double movement: difference presents itself as both differentiation (with a “t”) 
in the virtual; and as differenciation (with a “c”) in the actual. the structures of multi-
ple differential relations comprise ideas as intensive multiplicities.  deleuze considers 
ideas as “‘differentials’ of thought, or the ‘unconscious’ of pure thought…related not to 
a cogito…but to the fractured i of a dissolved cogito” (deleuze 1994: 194) that would 
have described a pre-conceptual (indeed, decentred) subject of experience.
the realm of the virtual exceeds just the possible. the possible can be realized, and 
the real thing is to exist in the image and likeness, as the saying goes, of the possible thing. 
But the virtual is not realized, it is always already real—even without being the actual! 
instead it actualises itself through multiple different/ciations so that virtual tendencies 
have the potential of becoming actual by means of different/ciations of the transcen-
dental and “initially undifferentiated field” (deleuze 1993: 10). the actual does not re-
semble the virtual as a mirror-reflection might. the two are related not mimetically but 
semiotically; they are different, and it cannot be otherwise because the virtual is pos-
ited just as a tendency, therefore no-thing. virtual tendencies as potentialities or no-things 
become actualized as though created ex nihilo and embodied in the actual things, in the 
guise of new objects of knowledge, new meanings. 
the nuance is significant, and deleuze and guattari use a sort of neo-Platonic lan-
guage to elucidate their point: it is “[f]rom virtuals [that] we descend to actual states of 
affairs, and from states of affairs we ascend to virtuals, without being able to isolate one 
from the other” (deleuze and guattari 1994: 160). While not all of the virtualities may 
become actualized in the present, they are nevertheless real. Because virtual ideas exist 
as implicit tendencies they define the immanence of the transcendental field. deleuze 
introduces his notion of the plane of immanent consistency as the infinite becoming of 
the virtual qua virtual. 
maximilian de gaynesford (2001) relates deleuze’s philosophy to the fourth- to fifth-
century theology, and michael hardt (1993: 17) indicates a subtle connection of de-
leuze’s thought to scholastic ontology. in scholastic terminology virtual means the ideal 
or transcendental, but not in any way abstract or just possible: it is maximally real, ens 
realissimum.  What is traditionally called a mystical experience is, for deleuze, an exis-
tential practice of sorts as an experiential and experimental art of perceiving (seeing) the 
otherwise imperceptible (invisible). the movement from the observable hence known to 
the invisible and as yet unknown, hence mystical but, importantly, knowable takes place 
in the direction contra direct perception, from the actual to the virtual. 
in one of his books on the analysis of cinematic images, deleuze (1989) equates mys-
tical experience with an event of a sudden actualisation of potentialities, that is, awak-
ening of perceptions, such as seeing and hearing, by raising them to a new power of en-
hanced perception. this is percept which is future-oriented towards a virtual object of 
perception (appearing for the present moment as yet imperceptible) within the very dy-
namics of becoming-other or becoming-actual when both movements meet each other 
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and the ascending/descending lines cross and traverse. in these critical junctures of ex-
perience “the body plunges into the virtual or spiritual depths which exceed it” (god-
dard 2001: 57). 
the excess of meanings actualizes itself in a singular transformative, quasi-mystical, 
experience. traditionally such experience is taken to be ecstatic but not necessarily. the 
discovery of the spiritual depth in oneself is enstasy as complementary to ecstasy or rapture 
beyond oneself: the way to paradise as a symbol of the most fundamental layer uniting 
human soul and cosmos can be found by either experience. deleuze notices that the 
point of the unification of experience is not only virtual but also that such a point “is 
not without similarities to the one-Whole of the Platonists” (deleuze 1991: 93).  indeed, 
mystics’ “vision and…voice…would have remained virtual” (goddard 2001: 54) unless 
some specific conditions or events in the real experience that are necessary for the ac-
tualisation of the virtual would have been established thus expanding the perceptual 
field. 
Percept thereby is part and parcel of conceptual understanding, and philosophical 
thinking, for deleuze, is equivalent to the art of the creation or invention of concepts, of 
our new understanding of experience, its meaning. concepts are not given but invented 
or created as if reborn in experience, at the level of practical ethical action. the crea-
tive process itself is accomplished by affect, or desire, akin to Platonic eros. each concept 
“should express an event rather than essence” (deleuze 1995: 25) and exists in a triadic 
relationship with percept and affect: “you need all three to get things moving” (deleuze 
1995: 165; italics in original). the field of knowing is greater than truth which “has to be 
created” (deleuze 1995: 126) and, for deleuze, “there is no other truth than the creation 
of the new: creativity, emergence” (1989: 146-147).
affect, desire, eros, love, creation! Whatever its name, this is what accomplishes 
unity or oneness of the neo-Platonic double, that is, ultimately, self-referential or cir-
cular movement of ascending and descending analogous to the dynamic action of the 
deleuzian difference which is also of the nature of double movement: different/cia-
tion. eros, the mystical son of Poros and Penia, was conceived in the act that may have 
occurred in the middle and muddle of “groping experimentation …that belong[s] to 
the order of dreams, of pathological processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness, and 
excess” (deleuze & guattari 1994: 41). esoteric experiences border on mysticism, indeed. 
still, as a culmination of desire sparked between two deities, eros itself is a symbol of 
union. the desire, or eros, de-constructs the neo-Platonic oneness between the true, 
the good and the beautiful by means of bringing it (one) down to earth into the multi-
plicity and diversity of real, flesh-and-blood, human experiences. hence follows what 
deleuze and guattari (1987) call their mystical and magical formula expressed as “one 
= many” and which posits unity in plurality. the symbolic eros (love) as affect “does not 
take as its object persons or things, but the entire surroundings which it traverses” (de-
leuze & guattari 1987: 292) or transcends: empiricism is radically transcendental.  thus 
it is in the reality of experience that a line of transversal connection as a necessary con-
dition for “the famous mystical principle of coincidentia oppositorum, beyond the limit of all 
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human understanding” (Kearney 2001: 104) is being established. 
But should it really remain so? should such conjunction of opposites be relegated 
to the level above and over human understanding, which provides non other than an 
explanation in terms of the mystical, that is, beyond what Kearney qualifies as human 
limitations? expanding the limits of human understanding to encompass an extra, af-
fective, dimension means as we said earlier quoting idel & mcginn (1999), to stress the 
unity of  love and cognition as the governing principle of practical mysticism. if human un-
derstanding overcomes the narrow rationalist knowledge akin to habermas’ so called 
first way of knowing technical facts (cf. semetsky & lovat 2008) and allows itself to be 
enriched and expanded with affect/desire/love therefore seemingly blending into ar-
istotelian Nous poetikos, then the conditions for the actualization of virtual potentialities 
will have been created in experience per se! 
for deleuze, this means moving from the actual, that is, given to common sense 
in experience as observable and visible (the realm of the sensible in Plato’s scheme) to 
the virtual which appears unobservable, that is, seemingly imperceptible or invisible, how-
ever potentially knowable (the realm of the intelligible in Plato’s scheme). the unity of 
knowledge as the conjunction of opposites—coincidentia oppositorum—is thus made pos-
sible. therefore there is a definite method—deleuze’s transcendental empiricism—in the 
midst of what appears to be the madness of mysticism. 
importantly, and while exceeding a solely rational thought, deleuze’s radical em-
piricism is still “fundamentally linked to a logic—a logic of multiplicities” (deleuze 1987: 
viii). this unorthodox logic functions on the basis of the inclusion of the third, in-be-
tween, category that deleuze specifies as the symbolic conjunction “and” (cf. coinciden-
tia oppositorum). the static logical copula “is” gives way to the dynamics of the relation 
“and”, which is not “subordinate to the verb to be” (deleuze 1987: 57) and defies the 
logic of identity (“is”). if the dyad amounts to identity between the two terms in a rela-
tion, the genuine triad is based on difference2. What is striving to become the actual, is 
that what is in virtue and is only waiting in potentia for particular conditions in the real, 
and not merely possible, experience to come forward. 
the dynamic constituting the logic of the included middle functions in accord with 
“a theory and practice of relations, of the and” (deleuze 1987: 15), that is, it is necessarily 
triadic and forms a self-referential relation between affects, percepts, and concept. such 
self-reference would have indeed appeared circular, senseless, irrational, or mystical to 
a rational, centered, independent Cogito but not to a religious thinker who consistently 
practices “the self-correcting pattern of thinking embedded in the doctrine of the trin-
ity” (adams 2006: 238)3.  deleuze emphasized the triadic, we may say self-corrective, 
relationship based on the inseparability of percepts, affects, and concepts that together 
     2. for the detailed analysis of the triadic structure see one author’s (semetsky) earlier paper “from design 
to self-organization, or a proper structure for a proper function”, AXIOMATHES: An International Journal in 
Ontology and Cognitive Systems (springer), 2005, 15/4, pp. 575-597.
     3. in relation to habermas, adams notices that he considers religion metaphysical and positions 
habermas’ thought as contrary to anti-metaphysical negative theology as well as to christian doctrine. 
this is a question of interpretation in our opinion.
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form a semiotic triad structured analogously to charles sanders Peirce’s genuine sign4. 
it is the presence of affect, or desire, or love, or eros—as the included third—that con-
nects the levels of reality by crossing over or traversing the difference between the virtu-
al and the actual thus exceeding the reductive model of  solely cognitive understanding. 
it is eros that brings an affective dimension of the creative art into the domain of science 
by virtue of it functioning not in accord with the two-valued (true vs. false) logic but as 
embodying the logic of the included middle represented by the inclusion of the noume-
nal difference so that it establishes a semiotic “bridge, a transversality” (guattari 1995: 
23) connecting what otherwise appear as forever separate and rigid binary opposites. 
What was traditionally called the mystery and mysticism of coincidentia oppositorum is 
grounded in deleuze’s totally realist ontology that understands cosmos in terms of vir-
tual reality comprising multiple levels of existence. it is “the difference between the virtual 
and the actual [which] requires that the process of actualisation be a creation” (hardt 
1993: 18), and it is human creativity in practice as becoming capable of new understand-
ing and making a difference in the actual world of actions and experiences that appears 
to carry a flavour of mysticism. deleuze is careful to pinpoint a subtle difference be-
tween transcendent and transcendental: the virtual per se is immanent, not transcendent, 
to the actual, but the actual requires virtual as its own transcendental condition. it is an 
affect (desire, love), which is “immanent to a plane which it does not pre-exist” (deleuze 
1987: 89), that lays down the plane of immanent consistency for the construction of con-
cepts as to overcome the apparent limits of human predicament. such affective desire 
would perhaps be what nietzsche called the will to power; according to deleuze, how-
ever, there can be “other names for it. for example, ‘grace’.” (deleuze 1987: 91). 
Wherein the plane of immanence is being constructed, “the spiritual and the ma-
terial [as] two distinct yet indiscernible sides of the same fold” (goddard 2001: 62) do 
meet. the plane of immanence is enfolded analogous to the Baroque art that express-
es the harmonious multiplicity of the folds (deleuze 1993). according to the Baroque 
model, “knowledge is known only where it is folded” (deleuze 1993: 49): in fact, Being 
(capital B) at the cosmic level is fold. similar to the drapes in fabric, things themselves, 
as deleuze says, are wrapped up in nature; as for ideas—they are often so enveloped 
or enfolded “in the soul that we can’t always unfold or develop them” (deleuze 1993: 
49) based on subjective rationality as one’s conscious will solely unless experience itself 
would have presented conditions for their unfolding. deleuze (1988b) shares with spino-
za his assertion that rather than our affirming or denying something of a thing, it is in 
fact the thing itself that would affirm or deny something of itself in us, overcoming in 
this process the limitations of narrow self-centered knowledge. the plane of immanence 
always presupposes an extra dimension—its own transcendental condition as though 
populated by “grace”—which, being supplementary to the plane per se, easily appears 
     4. Both habermas and deleuze knew charles s. Peirce’s work. deleuze (1986, 1989) explicitly refers to 
Peirce in his analysis of cinematic images. one author (semetsky) devoted a chapter “Becoming-sign” 
in her 2006 book Deleuze, Education and Becoming to analysing similarities between deleuze’s and Peirce’s 
approaches to logic and reasoning.
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as mystical. 
so, what seems to be a mystical experience is a potential human ability to raise 
“each faculty to the level of its transcendent exercise [and] to give birth to that second 
power which grasps that which can only be sensed” (deleuze 1994: 165) thus connect-
ing the levels that seemingly belong to two disparate Platonic realms of intelligible and 
sensible by virtue establishing a mutual bond akin to the synchronistic bridge between 
mind and matter (cf. Peat 1987). Perception would not become a percept without the 
two-way double, what deleuze called diagonal or transversal, communication the func-
tion of which is “to show the imperceptible” (deleuze 1995: 45) by virtue of making vis-
ible (perceptible) that what was as yet invisible (imperceptible). Perception undergoes 
transformation or increase in power into a future-oriented becoming-percept which is 
necessary for the creation of novel concepts. and the very passage between the two is an 
affect.
a newly created concept that includes in itself an affective (erotic) dimension akin to 
the aforementioned union of love and cognition as a condition of practical mysticism is 
ultimately self-referential. Being self-referential, the concept—at the very moment of its 
creation—posits itself and its object simultaneously. the concept stops being a proposi-
tional statement: “it does not belong to a discursive system and it does not have a refer-
ence. the concept shows itself ” (deleuze and guattari 1994: 140) in experience, at the 
level of practical ethical action as embodied knowledge. such is the aforementioned 
habermasian unity of knowledge and action that in deleuze acquires deeper, onto-
logical, significance.  sure enough, aristotelian practical wisdom is embodied in ethical 
action performed by a wise, virtuous person and by necessity includes a special sensitiv-
ity and sensibility (cf. slote 1997; varela 1999); yet how such an unusual (mystical?) sen-
sibility operates has never been made clear in the philosophical literature. here are two 
key questions: how is an epistemic access to the true and the good possible? Whence 
any foundation for moral knowledge? 
the answers lie in deleuze’s self-referential triad of affects-percepts-concepts which 
is grounded in his ontology of the virtual and enables a glimpse into the functioning of 
phronesis when, sure enough, “the concept shows itself ” to the one who has the poten-
tial of becoming-wise via self-reference (self-reflection). Wisdom, then, as the highest 
intellectual virtue, would be the actualized potentiality, in aristotelian terms. But most 
importantly, it is immanent to the plane that it itself constructs by virtue of an “un-
conscious psychic mechanism that engenders the perceived in consciousness” (deleuze 
1993: 95). for deleuze, “immanence is the unconscious itself ” (deleuze, 1988b: 29). the 
creation of concepts always takes place “in and through the unconscious, thereby es-
tablishing the bond of a profound complicity between nature and mind” (deleuze 1994: 
165) leading to the conjunction which determines the very threshold of consciousness. 
the plane of immanence, however, “does not immediately take effects with con-
cepts” (deleuze and guattari 1994: 41): it is pre-rational and a-conceptual, ultimately 
enabling “the conquest of the unconscious” (deleuze 1988b: 29) during its own imma-
nent, at once constructive and expressive (double movement!) process. the actualisation 
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of potentialities, ontologically, is then akin, in terms of epistemology, to the unconscious-be-
coming-conscious, thereby crossing over (or traversing) in a manner of practical mys-
ticism what ordinarily appears to be a “fundamental distinction between subrepre-
sentative, unconscious and aconceptual ideas/intensities and the conscious conceptual 
representation of common sense” (Bogue 1989: 59).  any object of experience contains 
potentialities as virtual or implicit, imperceptible, meanings, even if they are not yet ac-
tualised or made explicit hence perceptible. 
to elucidate, deleuze refers to music “where the principle of composition is not 
given in a directly perceptible, audible, relation with what it provides. it is therefore a 
plane of transcendence, a kind of design, in a mind of man or in the mind of god, even 
when it is accorded a maximum of immanence by plunging it into the depth of nature, 
or of the unconscious” (deleuze 1987: 91). for deleuze, it is nature itself that is essen-
tially “contingent, excessive, and mystical” (deleuze 1994: 57). the dynamic of the vir-
tual is based on a natural rhythm that involves  “a transcoded passage from one milieu 
to another…coordination …constitution of a new plane, bridging. …nature as music” 
(deleuze and guattari 1987: 313-314). nature as music exceeds the observable world 
of physical facts but must include its own virtual dimension which however is never 
beyond the potential capacities of human experience, hence understanding. 
the corollary is another inseparable immanent/transcendent triad constituting 
cosmos itself: man, nature, god (or Nous) where each stands in a relation of a “recipro-
cal presupposition” (deleuze & guattari 1987: 109) as the included middle between the 
other two so as to establish rapport and coordination between one’s practical action and 
the world via the depth of spiritual life, that is, mystics’ knowing self and god as one as 
we said at the very beginning of this paper. a symbolic mediation provides “intensity, 
resonance…harmony” (deleuze 1995: 86); yet it appears imperceptible and, as such, 
borders on a direct (hence mystical) contact with the divine. the contact in question 
can be described by means of “non-localizable connections, actions at a distance, sys-
tems of replay, resonance and echoes…which transcend spatial locations and temporal 
successions” (deleuze 1994: 83). concepts are forever fuzzy and their truth-conditions 
are never completely determined precisely because of the necessarily “added” affective 
dimension of experience: although “a concept…has the truth that falls to it as a function 
of the conditions of its creation” (deleuze & guattari 1994: 27), the very singularity of 
experiential conditions makes truth “a being-multiple” (deleuze 1987: viii). 
there exist forces constraining experience or making it singular; as deleuze says, 
the most important is a self-referential relation when a force impinges on itself: “an affect 
of self  on self” (deleuze 1988a: 101). it is indeed the issue of self-reference coupled with 
sentience that appears to “have been making trouble for philosophers for centuries” 
(Kelso and engstrom 2006: 253). in their recent book “the complementary nature”, 
Kelso and engstrom (2006) introduce a notation tilde “~” as a symbol for pinpointing 
the relation per se, and assert that in “the case of human beings, complex nonlinear self-
organizing [that is, self-referential] systems of energy~matter have managed to evolve 
to the point of organizing a sense of self~other” (2006: 253) as a complementary pair. 
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a self-referential relation is what establishes the meaningful correlations—an anal-
ogy or correspondence—between/across the different levels of reality. according to 
the new science of complementary pairs, these levels, rather than being alien to each 
other in the manner of cartesian dualism, are connected via what Kelso and engstrom 
specify and present as coordination dynamics. different “self~other” (self~not-self) pairs do 
belong to the variety of discourses; their commonality derived from the same relational 
dynamics “contained” in the logic of the included middle. such an unorthodox logic 
(really, a contradiction in terms within a strictly analytic reasoning) is akin to what con-
temporary mathematician louis Kauffman (1996), incidentally or not, calls virtual or 
archaic logic that “goes beyond reason into a world of beauty, communication and pos-
sibility” (Kauffman 1996: 293) as well as beyond given facts into a world of interpretable 
symbols, meanings and values. 
the constructive, creative logic of the included middle is what “energizes reason…
[and] provides the real possibility and the means for opening of communication across 
boundaries long thought to be impenetrable” (Kauffman 1996: 293). such a transver-
sal, using deleuze’s neologism, communication in which “observer and observed are 
one” (Kauffman 1996: 295)—the very subject matter of this paper—is what guaran-
tees self-reference. the emphasis on communication across boundaries indicates that 
there is a multiplicity of interdependent levels of reality as though desperately trying to 
understand each other expressive “language”, thus to create shared meanings along the 
communicative link expressed by the relation “~”. the apparent dichotomies and anti-
nomies of the old “either-or” narrow reasoning are being transcended and traversed in 
accordance with the new “both-and” science of coordination dynamics. 
yet, what appears to be new to “objective” science has all along been familiar to reli-
gious thinking. the relational, complementary, nature is the very condition of its know-
ability by analogy that, while preeminent in mystical teachings with regard to essential 
kinship and oneness, remains foreign to physical causality that deliberately separates 
the observer from what is observed. mystics, however, as well as creative artists or true 
philosophers, play an intensive, participatory, role. even if apparently creating concepts 
out of “no-things” in the realm of the virtual, they still “do not conjure things out of thin 
air, even if their conceptions and productions appear as utterly fantastical. their com-
positions are only possible because they are able to connect, to tap into the virtual and 
immanent processes” (ansell Pearson 1997: 4) that constitute deleuze’s virtual reality. 
among complementary pairs in which the terms are related, or coordinated, 
are the following: res cogitans~res extensa, rationalism~empiricism; science~religion; 
immanence~transcendence; body~mind; yin~yang; being~becoming; and ultimately 
human~divine as well. mind and nature therefore cease being binary opposites but are 
coordinated thus complementing a theoretical episteme with practical phronesis resulting 
from the reciprocity or complementarily between knowledge and action. in this re-
spect, deleuze’s philosophy is naturalistic akin to ancient science as a natural philoso-
phy contra scientism of modernity—and deleuze and guattari’s emphasis on nonlinear 
enfolded dynamics of experience (cf. delanda 2002) puts them at the very front of the 
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latest contemporary developments in the science of coordination dynamics. 
Being self-referential, the concept—at the moment of creation—posits itself and its 
object simultaneously, thus defying a dualistic split between subject and object, matter 
and mind, science and art, sacred and profane. if we read re-ligio etymologically as link-
ing backward to itself in the process of enriching human life with “spiritual fecundity” 
(idel & mcginn 1999:13) we understand that self-reference, due to the included middle, 
ultimately means self-transcendence. in deleuze’s words, it constitutes the very becoming-
other—akin to what at the start of the paper we called the transformation of the self as 
a feature of practical mysticism—when it (self) “changes in nature as it expands its con-
nections” (deleuze and guattari 1987: 8) in the extended experience that now becomes 
open to perception.
Changes in nature? isn’t it surely an element of mysticism? the answer is both yes and 
no, or better to say, continuing the argument for complementary pairs, it is a yes~no rela-
tion. the human creative potential is enabled by the coordination dynamics embedded 
in the complementary nature as founded on an analogical relation (“tilde”) expressed 
by “the manner in which the existing being is filled with immanence” (deleuze 1997: 
137). an analogical, coordinated, relation between the human and the divine, between 
the levels of the virtual and the actual, establishes in practice deleuze’s transforma-
tional pragmatics of becoming-other which “is neither one nor two; …it is the in-between” 
(deleuze and guattari 1987: 293). the practical transformation of the self takes place 
along the vanishing transversal line at the very limit of human experience that therefore 
always contains a numinous, religious, bordering on mystical, aspect.
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